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Abstract: We discuss ways in which category theory might be useful in
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Our aim in this article is to recommend category theory to philosophers
of science, in particular as a means to articulating the structure of scien-
tific theories. We are not suggesting that we replace first-order logic, model
theory, set theory, and similar formal tools with category theory — as if
category theory were just one more competitor among various formal ap-
proaches to philosophy of science. Much less are we proposing to replace set
theory with category theory as the foundation of mathematics. Rather, we
suggest that category theory unifies various approaches to formal philosophy
of science, and shows that some of the debates between various approaches
have been misguided. But most importantly, our proposal is not ideological,
i.e. we have no stake in the claim that category theory is the “one and only
correct” approach to scientific theories, much less that, “a scientific theory
is a category.” Rather, we are merely sketching a program of research in
formal philosophy of science: we suggest that it might be interesting to think
of the “universe” of scientific theories as a category of categories, or more
precisely, as a 2-category of categories.
Our proposal includes the idea that familiar scientific theories (e.g. Hamil-
tonian mechanics, special and general relativity, quantum mechanics, quan-
tum field theory) can themselves fruitfully be described as categories.1 If
∗Department of Philosophy, Princeton University
1For more on this idea, including evidence of its fruitfulness, see (Weatherall, 2016).
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we represent theories this way, then we can take philosophical questions
— e.g. are Hamiltonian and Lagrangian mechanics equivalent theories? —
make them precise, and then use mathematical tools to answer these ques-
tions. We can also suggest various explications of important notions, such
as equivalence or reducibility, and can then try to prove general theorems
about such notions. In short, we commend category theory to the attention
of technically oriented philosophers of science.
1 Theories as categories
Before we begin to discuss scientific theories, we review some basic notions
of categorical logic, in order to frame the discussion of theories as categories.
There are two salient ways in which a theory can be thought of as a category
— a syntactic way, and a semantic way.
1.1 The syntactic category
In this entire chapter, when we speak of first-order logic, we mean first-
order logic with possibly many sorts. Allowing the flexibility of many sorts
doesn’t truly add to the expressive power of first-order logic; but ignoring
the possibility of many sorts can lead to needless confusions (see Barrett
and Halvorson, 2015c).
What we mean by “many-sorted” logic is that a signature Σ comes with
a (finite) list σ1, σ2, . . . of types, and variables, quantifiers, etc. are tagged
by a particular type. For example, for each type σ, there is an equality
symbol =σ, which can be applied only to terms of type σ. Similarly, each
predicate symbol p ∈ Σ has an arity σ1 × . . . × σn, where σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ
are (not necessarily distinct) sort symbols. Likewise, each function symbol
f ∈ Σ has an arity σ1 × . . . × σn → σ, where σ1, . . . , σn, σ ∈ Σ are again
(not necessarily distinct) sort symbols. Lastly, each constant symbol c ∈ Σ
is assigned a sort σ ∈ Σ. In addition to the elements of Σ we also have a
stock of variables. We use the letters x, y, and z to denote these variables,
adding subscripts when necessary. Each variable has a sort σ ∈ Σ.
Given a signature Σ, we define the terms and formulas of Σ in the normal
way (see Barrett and Halvorson, 2015b). A theory T in Σ, is then a set
of sentences (or sequents) of Σ. There are, of course, many well known
examples of such theories: e.g. the theory of partially ordered sets, the theory
of groups, the theory of Boolean algebras, the theory of vector spaces over
a field, the theory of categories, etc..
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The immediate goal is to associate a category CT with a theory T . For
several reasons, we will suppose that the theory T is formulated in the co-
herent fragment of first-order logic, whose only connectives are ∧ and ∨,
and whose only quantifier is ∃.2 There is reason to think that the coherent
fragment is adequate to formulate any theory that can be formulated in full
first order logic. In particular, via Morleyization, every first-order theory
is Morita equivalent to a coherent theory (see Tsementzis, 2015). What’s
more, we agree that coherent logic is special: “there are good reasons why
it is better to take Lgωω [the coherent fragment of (finitary) first-order logic]
as basic rather than Lωω [full (finitary) first-order logic].” (Makkai and
Reyes, 1977, p. 121). In our case, two such reasons seem especially com-
pelling. Firstly, as emphasized by Makkai and Reyes, in coherent logic the
distinction between intuitionistic and classical logic essentially disappears.
Secondly, restricting ourselves to coherent logic does not practically dimin-
ish our expressive power at all: as Johnstone (2002) points out there are
very few theories that are useful in mathematical practice that cannot be
axiomatized by coherent sentences.
The standard way of building a “syntactic category” for T is described
in many works on categorical logic — see (MacLane and Moerdijk, 2012,
p. 555), (Makkai and Reyes, 1977, p. 241), (Johnstone, 2002, p. 841), and
(van Oosten, 2002, p. 39). In outline: an object of the syntactic category
CT is a formula in context, i.e. if φ is a formula of Σ, and if ~x is a string of
variables containing all those free in φ, then {~x.φ} is a formula in context.
(Note that the objects of CT depend only on the signature Σ, and not on the
theory T .) Defining the arrows for CT takes a bit more work. Let χ(~x, ~y) be
a formula of Σ, where ~x and ~y are mutually disjoint sequences of variables.
We say that χ(~x, ~y) is a T -provably functional relationship from {~x.φ} to
{~y.ψ} just in case T entails that, “for any ~x such that φ(~x), there is a unique
~y such that ψ(~y) and χ(~x, ~y).” (The precise definition can be found in the
aforementioned works on categorical logic.) Then we define an arrow from
{~x.φ} to {~y.ψ} to be an equivalence class, relative to T -provable equivalence,
of T -provably functional relations from {~x.φ} to {~y.ψ}.
2Strictly speaking this means that a theory T is a set of sequents of the form φ ` ψ
where φ and ψ are coherent formulas. Alternatively, one can understand such sequents as
first-order sentences of the form ∀~x(φ → ψ) (where ~x includes the unbound variables of
both φ and ψ). In order not to deviate too much from the standard notation familiar to
philosophers and logicians alike we will consider coherent theories to be sets of first-order
sentences of the above-described form – this will allow us to speak of truth and satisfaction
of a sentence rather than of a sequent, which is closer to the standard way of thinking
about these matters.
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The idea of a syntactic category might seem abstract and unfamiliar. But
it is a direct generalization of the more familiar idea of a Lindenbaum algebra
from propositional logic. Suppose that Σ = {p0, p1, . . .} is propositional
signature, and let T be a theory in Σ. In this case, a formula in context
simplifies to a sentence; and so the objects of CT are just sentences. In this
case, there is one provably functional relation (up to T -provable equivalence)
between φ and ψ just in case T, φ ` ψ and otherwise there is no such provably
functional relation. In other words, in CT for a propositional theory T , there
is an arrow from φ to ψ just in case T, φ ` ψ.
Thus, from a theory T (considered as a set of sentences in Σ) we have
constructed a category CT . And we can immediately note that CT partially
eliminates the “language dependence” of T , which was so bemoaned by
advocates of the semantic view of theories. Indeed, while T is bound to a
particular signature Σ, the syntactic category CT is independent of signature
in the following sense: two theories T and T ′, in different signatures, can
nonetheless have equivalent syntactic categories.
Furthermore, if our theory is coherent – as we are assuming – then this
syntactic category CT has the structure of a so-called coherent category. Co-
herent categories are categories that have just the right amount of structure
to express models of coherent theories. In particular, they have a notion
of conjunction (pullbacks), a notion of disjunction (pullback-stable disjoint
coproducts) and a notion of existential closure (pullback-stable images).3
To see that the syntactic category of a coherent theory is a coherent cate-
gory is straightforward: the coherent structure of CT emerges naturally out
of the coherent formulas that are used to define its objects. (For example,
the finite product of two objects {~x.φ} and {~y.ψ} is given by the object
{~x, ~y.φ ∧ ψ}.) Moreover, there are “as many” coherent categories as there
are coherent theories: as we just saw, every coherent theory gives rise to a
coherent category; conversely, every coherent category is equivalent to the
syntactic category of a coherent theory.
But is the syntactic category CT an adequate representative of the orig-
inal theory T? Here we answer in the affirmative, following Makkai and
Reyes:
“In Chapter 8 we will show that, in a sense made precise there,
logical [i.e. coherent] categories are the same as theories in a
finitary coherent logic Lgωω.” (Makkai and Reyes, 1977, p. 121)
And also:
3One proper definition of a coherent category is a category that has finite limits, stable
disjoint coproducts and coequalizers of kernel pairs.
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“The content of 8.1.3 and 8.1.4 can be expressed by saying that
for all practical purposes, T and CT are the same.” (Makkai and
Reyes, 1977, p. 241)
In what sense are T and CT the same? Roughly: replacing one with
the other involves no essential loss of information. There are a couple of
ways we can make this precise. First, the theory T can be reconstructed
from CT in the following sense: each coherent category C gives rise to a
canonically specified (coherent) theory TC . TC is (essentially) the set of
sentences satisfied by C when C is understood as a model of the theory
of coherent categories, i.e. the “total” theory of C qua coherent category.
More precisely, for any coherent category C we have its canonical language
ΣC whose sorts are the objects of C and function symbols the arrows of C
(sorted in the obvious way). Over this language ΣC we can then express
in a straightforward way what it is for a diagram in C to commute, what
it is for a diagram to be a product diagram etc. TC is then the collection
of all those ΣC-sentences expressing all those facts that are true of C as
a coherent category. We then have that T is recoverable from CT in the
following sense:
Theorem 1. Given a theory T , and its syntactic category CT , the internal
theory TCT of CT is Morita equivalent to T .
For the proof, see (Tsementzis, 2015, Corollary 4.6). We will further
explain the notion of Morita equivalence in the following subsection as well as
argue for its suitability as a good notion of equivalence between theories. For
now, one may simply read the above result as “T is equivalent to TCT ” and
take it on faith that “Morita equivalence” is a sensible notion of equivalence
between theories.
Second, the category Mod(T ) of models of T can be reconstructed from
its syntactic category CT .
Theorem 2. Let T be a coherent theory, and let CT be its syntactic category.
Let Coh(CT ,S) be the category whose objects are coherent functors from CT
into the category S of sets, and whose arrows are natural transformations.
Let Mod(T ) be the category whose objects are models of T , and whose ar-
rows are homomorphisms between models. Then Coh(CT , S) is equivalent
to Mod(T ).
For the proof, see (Makkai and Reyes, 1977, p. 240).
The two preceding results show the sense in which there is no loss of
essential information in passing from a theory T to its syntactic category
5
CT . (In particular, the Morita equivalence class of a theory can be recovered
from that theory’s syntactic category.) It is tempting now to conjecture
that if T and T ′ are Morita equivalent, then CT and CT ′ are equivalent
categories. But that conjecture fails, since the categories CT and CT ′ might
not be “conceptually complete” in the sense of Makkai and Reyes (1977).
We discuss this issue further in the following subsection.
1.2 Equivalent theories
Before proceeding to discuss the semantic category Mod(T ) associated with
a theory T , we will briefly discuss some ideas about when two theories are
equivalent (for further discussion and technical results, see (Barrett and
Halvorson, 2015a,b; Tsementzis, 2015)). The first question to be asked
here is what notion of equivalence are we intending to capture? Our an-
swer here is that we have no intention of capturing any Platonic essence of
“equivalence.” Rather, just as a group theory gives us a fruitful notion of
equivalence between groups (viz. isomorphism), and just as category theory
gives us a fruitful notion of equivalence between categories (viz. categorical
equivalence), so when theories are treated as mathematical objects, we hope
to find a notion of equivalence that will be useful and illuminating.
The strictest notion of equivalence between theories is logical equiva-
lence: two theories T and T ′ are said to be logically equivalent just in case
they are formulated in the same signature Σ, and they have the same logical
consequences among the sentences of Σ. Of course, logical equivalence is
of no use for theories formulated in different signatures. For that case, we
look to notions of how a theory can define new concepts that do not occur
in the original signature Σ. Recall that a definitional extension T+ in Σ+
of the theory T in Σ is the result of adding new predicate symbols, function
symbols, or constant symbols that can be defined by T in terms of formulas
in the original signature Σ. There is every reason, moreover, to think of a
definitional extension T+ as equivalent to the original theory T . Thus, two
theories T1 (in Σ1) and T2 (in Σ2) are said to be definitionally equivalent
just in case there are definitional extensions T+i of Ti in Σ1∪Σ2 (for i = 1, 2)
such that T+1 is logically equivalent to T
+
2 .
Nonetheless, there are reasons to think that definitional equivalence is
not the most fruitful notion of equivalence between theories. One such rea-
son is that it doesn’t match well with the notions of equivalence between the
corresponding syntactic categories (two theories can have equivalent syntac-
tic categories without being definitionally equivalent). Another reason is
that definitional equivalence cannot capture the sense in which, for exam-
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ple, the theory of categories can be equivalently formulated using objects
and arrows, or just with arrows. In order to capture these intuitive verdicts
of equivalence, the most plausible idea is Morita equivalence, which allows
for equivalence of theories formulated not only in different signatures but
also in different signatures with different sorts.
The notion of “Morita equivalence” of theories has two independent
sources.4 On the one hand, Morita equivalence is suggested by ideas from
categorical logic, in particular from topos theory. To see this, we need to
introduce the notion of the pretopos completion P (C) of a coherent category
C. This notion can be described in the following equivalent ways:
1. P (C) is the result of freely adjoining finite coproducts and coequalizers
of equivalence relations to C (see Johnstone, 2002, A1.4).
2. P (C) is the subcategory of coherent objects in the topos Sh(C) of
sheaves on C, where the site C is equipped with the coherent Grothendieck
topology.
Recall that the classifying topos ET of the theory T is the unique (up to
categorical equivalence) topos that contains a model of T , and such that
any model of T in another topos E uniquely lifts to a geometric morphism
from ET into E (see MacLane and Moerdijk, 2012, p. 561 and Makkai and
Reyes, 1977, p. 272).
Now two coherent theories S and T are said to be Morita equivalent (in
the categorical sense) just in case the following equivalent conditions hold
(see Johnstone, 2002).
1. The classifying toposes ES and ET are equivalent.
2. The pretoposes PS and PT are equivalent.
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The equivalence between these two statements follows from the fact that
ET ' Sh(CT ) ' Sh(PT ). Moreover, it follows from the second fact that if
CT is equivalent to CS , then S and T are Morita equivalent. To see that the
converse is not true, it suffices to display a theory T such that its syntactic
category CT is not a pretopos. Such theories are easy to find (see Example
1 below).
4The name “Morita equivalence” originates in module theory, and was transmitted into
category theory through the study of algebraic theories.
5Here we use PT to abbreviate P (CT ), the pretopos completion of the syntactic category
of T .
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In a completely unrelated development, ideas related to Morita equiv-
alence began to spring up in the works of logicians. As noted by Harnik
(2011), Shelah’s T eq construction (also known as “elimination of imaginar-
ies”) is closely related to the pretopos completion construction. Indeed, the
pretopos completion PT of a theory CT is the same thing as the syntactic
category of T eq, i.e. Shelah’s construction applied to T . Similarly, Andre´ka
et al. (2001) generalize the notion of a definitional extension so as to include
the possibility of defining new sort symbols. We refer the reader to those
works to see the original motivations for moving to a more expansive notion
of equivalence between theories. For our purposes in this paper, the follow-
ing motivation suffices: the pretopos completion PT of a syntactic category
CT represents a kind of “maximal mereological completion” of T , i.e. a
theory in which not only everything implicitly defined by T receives its own
name, but also every (suitable) combination of types of things in T receives
its own name. Thus, for example, in PT we have distinct names both for
constants and for pairs consisting just of those constants (the type of pairs
is in some sense “reified”).
But what exactly does this all mean at the level of syntax? As has
been explained by Barrett and Halvorson (2015b) and Tsementzis (2015),
the ideas about Morita equivalence coming from topos theory correspond to
a completely natural generalization of the idea of having a common defini-
tional extension. In particular, given a theory T in signature Σ, a Morita
extension T+ of T can be constructed either by defining new relation and/or
function symbols, or by defining new sorts from the sorts of Σ. The opera-
tion of defining new sorts via T corresponds roughly to taking the pretopos
completion of CT . Thus, intuitively speaking, two theories T and T
′ are
Morita equivalent just in case T can define all the sorts, relation symbols,
etc. of T ′, and vice versa, in a compatible fashion.6 And in fact it can be
shown that two theories are Morita equivalent in the syntactic sense just
in case the pretopos completions of their syntactic categories are equiva-
lent – see (Tsementzis, 2015, Theorem 4.7). This merely expresses the fact
that the syntactic notion of Morita equivalence developed in (Barrett and
Halvorson, 2015b) coincides with – and therefore characterizes – the topos-
theoretic notion defined in (Johnstone, 2002). This justifies our free use of
the same term “Morita equivalence” to refer to both notions.
Clearly if two syntactic categories CT and CT ′ are equivalent, then T
6For an example of how this “definitional” understanding of Morita equivalence can
be applied to issues of theoretical equivalence in physics, see the discussion on classical
mechanics in (Teh and Tsementzis, 2015).
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and T ′ are Morita equivalent. The converse, however, is not true.
Example 1. An easy way to see this is to take the an empty two-sorted
theory T , i.e. the theory with no axioms whose signature Σ consists only
of two sort symbols σ1, σ2. Then we can extend T to T
′ by adding a “co-
product sort” σ1 + σ2 together with function symbols ρ1:σ1 → σ1 + σ2 and
ρ2:σ2 → σ1 + σ2 and axioms defining σ1 + σ2 as a “coproduct” with ρ1 and
ρ2 as its coprojections. Indeed T
′ is exactly a Morita extension of T in the
sense of (Barrett and Halvorson, 2015b) which means that T and T ′ are
Morita equivalent. However, the syntactic categories CT and CT ′ cannot be
equivalent: the obvious embedding CT ↪→ CT ′ is full and faithful but there
can be no isomorphism from {z:σ1 +σ2.>} to any object of CT (regarded as
a full subcategory of CT ′). (Given the results of Tsementzis (2015), this is
also an example of two theories which have equivalent pretopos completions
but inequivalent syntactic categories.) y
As such, we are left with two distinct notions of equivalence between
theories T and T ′:
(SE) Equivalence of their syntactic categories, i.e. CT ' CT ′
(ME) Morita Equivalence
For reasons too detailed to go into here, we believe that (SE), although
weaker than logical equivalence, is still too strong a notion. As noted above,
(SE) is a sufficient condition for (ME) to hold, but not a necessary one.
There is a strong sense in which (ME) captures exactly the right content of
a theory as long as we care about that theory only up to the structure of its
category of models. In order to clarify this remark, we must now go on to
to say a few more words about this category of models.
1.3 The semantic category
We have already noted that there is a second category associated with a
theory T , namely the category Mod(T ) of its models. We will call Mod(T )
the semantic category associated with T .
Before proceeding, let’s be more precise about what we mean by the
category of models of T . The objects of this category are simply set-valued
models of T , in the sense of Tarski. But what are the arrows of the semantic
category? There are two possible choices:
• Let T be a theory in signature Σ. We let Mod(T ) denote the category
whose objects are Σ-structures that satisfy the axioms of T , and whose
9
arrows are homomorphisms of Σ-structures. Recall that if M and N
are Σ-structures, then a homomorphism j : M → N is a function that
preserves the extensions of symbols in Σ. That is, for each relation
symbol r ∈ Σ,
j(rM ) ⊆ rN , (1)
and so on.
In contrast to the definition found in most model theory textbooks, we
do not require the map j to be one-to-one, nor do we require equality
in (1). The reason we don’t impose these requirements is because
they are unmotivated when the logic at hand doesn’t have a negation
symbol (as in the case of coherent logic).
For example, if Σ = {◦, e}, and if T is the theory of groups (written in
Σ), then the notion of a homomorphism of Σ-structures is simply the
notion of a group homomorphism.
• We let Mode(T ) denote the category whose objects are (again) Σ-
structures that satisfy T , and whose arrows are elementary embed-
dings of Σ-structures. Recall that if M and N are Σ-structures, then
an elementary embedding j : M → N is a function that preserves
extensions of all Σ-formulas. That is, for any formula φ(~x) of Σ, and
for any n-tuple ~a of elements of M ,
M |= φ(~a) =⇒ N |= φ(j(~a)). (2)
In particular, for any sentence φ of Σ,
M |= φ =⇒ N |= φ. (3)
We can think of Mod(T ) as the “thick” category of models (more arrows)
and Mode(T ) as the “thin” category of models (fewer arrows) of T . Note
that Mode(T ) is a subcategory of Mod(T ), and typically a proper subcate-
gory.7 For example, let Σ be a signature with one sort and no non-logical
vocabulary, and let T be the empty theory in Σ, i.e. the theory whose models
are bare sets. Let mi be a model of T with i elements. Then Mod(T ) has an
arrow j : m1 → m2, whereas Mode(T ) has no such arrow (since elementary
embeddings preserve the truth-value of numerical statements).
7Indeed, Mode(T ) = Mod(T ) if and only if every first-order formula φ (over the sig-
nature Σ of T ) is T -provably equivalent to a coherent formula (over classical logic) – see
Johnstone (2002, Proposition 3.4.9).
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There are several questions one can ask of the relation between thin
and thick categories. A well-known fact – alluded to above – is that the
thin category of a full first-order theory is always equivalent to the thick
category of a coherent theory, called its Morleyization – see (Johnstone,
2002, Lemma D1.5.13). But for now, the most important point of this
subsection is that Mod(T ), and a fortiori Mode(T ), is not generally an
adequate representative of the theory T . This means that even the thick
categories of models are not “thick enough”. To be more precise, the passage
from T to Mod(T ) loses information in the sense that neither T , nor a
theory T ′ that is Morita equivalent to T , can be reconstructed from Mod(T ).
Examples from propositional logic makes this fact clear.
Example 2. For full first-order theories, there is an intuitive example. Let
Σ be the propositional logic signature with symbols p0, p1, . . .. Let T1 be
the empty theory in Σ, and let T2 be the theory with axioms p0 ` pi for all
i ∈ N. Clearly T1 and T2 are not Morita equivalent theories. And yet, the
semantic categories Mod(T1) and Mod(T2) are equivalent — since both are
discrete, and have 2ℵ0 objects. Thus, T1 and T2 are inequivalent theories
whose semantic categories are equivalent (see Halvorson, 2012, p. 191). y
Example 3. For coherent theories, coming up with examples requires a bit
more algebraic groundwork. Up to Morita equivalence, a coherent proposi-
tional theory is the same thing as the theory of prime filters of a (unique up
to isomorphism) distributive lattice (see Johnstone, 2002, Remark D1.4.14).
Given any such distributive lattice B the category of models of the corre-
sponding theory can then be identified with the spectrum of B. And if B is
Boolean (as a lattice) then its spectrum will be discrete. This means that up
to equivalence of their categories of S-models we can only recover a coherent
propositional theory up to the cardinality of its spectrum. However, there
are many examples of non-isomorphic Boolean lattices whose spectra have
equal cardinalities. Indeed a similar idea as our previous example works
again here. Let B1 be the Boolean algebra generated by a countably infinite
number of elements p0, p1, . . . and let B2 be the Boolean algebra generated
by the same elements plus the relation p0 ≤ pi for all i ∈ N. B1 is atom-
less whereas B2 has an atom and therefore B1 and B2 cannot be isomorphic.
However, the cardinality of both their spectrums is equal to 2ℵ0 a fact which
can be seen by noting that homomorphisms B1 → 2 correspond exactly to
homomorphisms φ:B2 → 2 such that φ(p0) = 0. y
The lesson here is that the semantic category of a theory — i.e. the
models of that theory, and homomorphisms between models — generally
contains less information than the theory itself does. A fortiori, the class
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of models of a theory contains less information than the theory itself does.
(And this is what’s wrong with the original semantic view of theories.)
It is completely natural to ask: if Mod(T ) does not contain the same
amount of information as T , then what information or structure must be
added to Mod(T ) in order to recover T? Think of the question this way:
Mod(T ) is a collection of models and arrows between models, including
automorphisms (i.e. arrows from a model to itself). What other information
about Mod(T ) can be extracted from the theory T?
A classic answer to this question was given (for the propositional case) by
Marshall Stone. Stone noted that T implicitly contains topological informa-
tion about Mod(T ). In particular, let’s say that a sequence m1,m2,m3, . . .
of models in Mod(T ) converges to a model m0 just in case for any sentence
φ of Σ, the truth value mi(φ) is eventually equal to m0(φ). This notion
of convergence defines a topology on Mod(T ). Letting Mod(T ) denote the
corresponding topological space, Stone’s duality theorem establishes the fol-
lowing:
Theorem (Stone Duality). The collection of compact open subsets of Mod(T )
forms a Boolean lattice that is equivalent, as a category, to CT .
In other words, from Mod(T ) we can reconstruct T up to its syntactic
category, i.e. up to (SE). Thus, in the case of propositional theories, the
topological semantic category Mod(T ) contains as much information as T .8
But what now about the case of predicate logic? Here the situation
is complicated by the fact that there are typically many non-trivial arrows
between models. Can the category Mod(T ) still be supplemented with topo-
logical information in order to recover T? The answer here is: Yes, sort of.
Although there is still no result that perfectly generalizes Stone Duality,
some important partial results have been obtained by Makkai (1991) and
Awodey and Forssell (2013).
Of course, philosophers of science should be eager to understand these
duality results because of the important lesson they teach about the collec-
tion of models of a theory:
8Lest we confuse our physics-minded readers let us clarify that “dualities” such as
Stone’s above are not to be thought of, from our point of view, as analogues of “dualities”
in modern physics. The latter are relations between theories. The Stone-type dualities
that we investigate here and in Section 3 are dualities that relate syntactic and semantic
presentation of a single theory. The terminological coincidence is unfortunate (even more
so since we are also interested in application of our framework to physical dualities) but,
for historical reasons, unavoidable.
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The category of models Mod(T ) of a theory T does not generally
contain all the information that is contained in the original the-
ory T . The content of T might include information, e.g., about
topological relations between models.
Let’s rephrase that moral one more time, now trying to make it absolutely
clear as a friendly amendment to the semantic view of theories:
The mathematical content of a scientific theory T is not ex-
hausted by the class of models of T .
Obviously, this moral from first-order logic doesn’t generalize directly to
scientific theories in the wild (e.g. classical mechanics, general relativity,
quantum mechanics). However, the results from first-order categorical logic
strongly suggest that in the case of scientific theories, we would similarly go
wrong if we identified the mathematical content of a theory T with its cate-
gory Mod(T ) of models9 — for the theory might make use of further struc-
tures on Mod(T ), perhaps topological (as in general relativity), or measure-
theoretic (as in statistical mechanics), or perhaps some sort of monoidal or
tensor structure (as in quantum mechanics and quantum field theory). For
some evidence for this claim, with reference to specific scientific theories, see
(Curiel, 2014) or (Fletcher, 2015), and for some related discussion see (Lal
and Teh, 2015).10
9An important clarification: when we say here that we would go wrong if we identified
the mathematical content of a theory T with its semantic category Mod(T ), recall that
this means the semantic category over the category of sets S. So what we are saying
here is that a theory cannot be recovered up to (ME) from its category of models in S.
Nevertheless, conceptual completeness for coherent logic (see Johnstone (2002, Theorem
D3.5.9)) says that this is very close to being true: equivalence of the semantic categories
of T and T ′ does imply (ME) as long as this equivalence is induced by an interpretation I
of T into T ′ at the level of syntax (i.e. a coherent functor I:PT → PT ′). Relatedly, there
is another sense in which a theory T is actually recoverable up to (ME) from its semantic
category: if we consider semantic categories over arbitrary Grothendieck toposes E and
stipulate that the equivalence E−Mod(T ) ' E−Mod(T ′) is natural in E , then from this
alone we can conclude that T and T ′ are Morita equivalent. This means that the extra
structure that we need to place on Mod(T ) (understood as the category of S-models) in
order to recover T up to Morita equivalence corresponds exactly to the requirement of
naturality in the class of Grothendieck toposes.
10We should also note that the question as to how these extra structures and topologies
map on to actual “topologies” and “structures” between scientific theories remains to
be explored. Clearly, the logical topologies on Mod(T ) encode a notion of “nearness”
between models of T — does this logical topology illuminate, or correspond in any way,
to the notions of “nearness” between models used by practicing scientists, e.g. when
mathematical physicists topologize the solution spaces of their differential equations. Are
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That said, we do not want to fall into the trap — all too common in 20th
century philosophy — of being blinded by the glow of a shiny new piece of
formal apparatus. We are fully aware that, from a mathematical point of
view, a syntactic category is regarded merely as a technical device useful
for proving other results, e.g. completeness theorems.11 Yet we believe
that the conceptual value of the kind of formal apparatus best encapsulated
by the syntactic category of a theory goes beyond its practical use within
mathematics. And unlike W.v.O. Quine, we have no ideological commitment
to regimenting theories in first-order logic. Rather, as just explained, we see
first-order logic as providing a manageable testing ground for more general
ideas about theoretical structure.
Nevertheless, what we are claiming here clearly amounts to a methodol-
ogy based on an analogy between the categorical metamathematics of first-
order theories and the philosophy of scientific theories. Is there any reason
to believe in the fruitfulness of this analogy? We believe so. Category the-
ory brings to the table new constructions and concepts with which to study
the metamathematics of first-order theories. And the metamathematics of
first-order theories – if anything – is rich in concepts (“theory”, “axioms”,
“interpretations” etc.) that are used heavily in the philosophy of scientific
theories. So as long one is not a complete skeptic with respect to the use
of logical methods to come up with idealized versions of scientific theories,
there is every reason – it seems to us – to take seriously the analogy on
which our method relies.
2 The category of theories
We have talked about theories as categories. But as the title of this paper
makes clear, what we are interested in is categories of theories. Namely, we
are interested in studying collections consisting of multiple scientific theo-
ries, and the relations between them. And since we’ve already argued that
theories can be thought of as categories, the natural way to do so is to study
the (2-)category of theories-as-categories. We can then apply the tools of
category theory to understanding the structure of this larger category, how
individual theories sit within it, and how theories are related to each other.
the logical topologies we consider here and in Section 3 good “frictionless” idealizations
of these kinds of investigations? The question certainly deserves more attention and we
intend to explore it in the future.
11And this extends to syntax very far removed from first-order logic, e.g. the meta-
mathematics of simple type theories or of Martin-Lo¨f type theories are also studied via
structure-bearing syntactic categories.
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Why would we want to do that? To be sure, the category of “theories-
as-categories” can be no more than a “frictionless” idealization of the actual
zoo of scientific theories and the interactions between them that take place
within it. But we are not interested in carrying out rigorous sociology –
we are interested in a formal framework that is sufficiently expressive to
act as such an idealization. In particular, a framework that formalizes the
notions both of a scientific theory and of “structural similarities” between
such scientific theories. Taking theories to be categories – as explained in
Section 1 – and then taking functors between such categories as expressions
of such a “structural similarity” gives us just such a framework. Being
the first to propose such an idea, we do of course realize that the choice
of category-theoretic formalism might prove inadequate in the long run;
perhaps it might appear as too idealized already. To this we say: may
others come and find better frameworks – this is the one we, at this moment
in time, consider the most fruitful idealization. (In this respect we believe
we are making no more arbitrary a choice than, say, what Carnap did when
he thought that the predicate calculus was an adequate idealization of the
language of science.)
And why do we view it as fruitful? Because we want to view scientific
theories not as contenders to the throne of absolute truth but rather as
creatures in an active ecosystem whose interactions are essential if more ad-
vanced life is to evolve out of it. It is this view that we take of the practice
of science today – and it is this picture that we want our formal framework
to be an idealization of. And we think the state of physics today justifies
this view. At the very least, because talking about the relationships between
scientific theories captures a critical feature of modern physics, namely the
existence of dualities – most prominently in string theory. Formal frame-
works in the philosophy of science of the 20th century (whether semantic
or syntactic) are not, we believe, adequate to model the dualities of mod-
ern physics. Thus, our attempt to define a category of scientific theories
can also be seen as our answer to the challenge of formally capturing such
inter-theoretical interactions.
With that said, let us now get down to the business of introducing a
suitable category of theories. As before, our initial focus is on the case of
theories in first order logic. As described in the previous section, each first-
order theory T corresponds to a syntactic category CT (which we could also
take to be PT ). We let the collection of all such CT be the objects of a
category Th, the category of all first-order theories.
Again, we have some fine-grained control over the definition of the cat-
egory Th of theories. The main possibilities for Th are as follows:
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• Coh the category of coherent categories (i.e. syntactic categories of
coherent theories);
• dCoh the category of decidable coherent categories (cf. Awodey and
Forssell, 2013);
• BCoh the category of Boolean coherent categories (i.e. syntactic cat-
egories of first-order theories over classical logic);
• Pretop the category of pretoposes.
These categories are arranged roughly as follows:
BCoh ⊆ dCoh ⊆ Coh
and
Pretop ⊆ Coh
where the subset symbol indicates a full inclusion of categories.
How do we choose among these (or other) options? An answer can be got-
ten by noting that such a choice amounts essentially to a choice of a “notion
of equivalence” for our theories. This is a specific case of a very important
(and far more general) observation about category-theoretic thinking, viz.
that choosing the category where your objects of study live automatically
determines what it means for two such objects to be “isomorphic”. This
important principle is worth stating:
(I) Choosing a notion of equivalence for our objects of study is the same
thing as choosing a category of which they are the objects.
In our case, the objects of study are theories. Thus, as (I) makes clear,
choosing a notion of equivalence for theories and choosing a “category of
theories” are not two independent choices. Choosing one determines the
other: there is only one degree of freedom here.
In our opinion, the two most natural choices for Th are Coh or Pretop.
Given (I) and the discussion in Section 1, this shouldn’t come as a surprise:
we’ve already said that the two notions of equivalence that interest us the
most are (SE) and (ME) and these correspond exactly to choosing Coh
(for (SE)) and Pretop (for (ME)) as our preferred categories of theories.
This is because (SE) identifies theories with their syntactic categories and
every coherent category is the syntactic category of some coherent theory,
whereas (ME) identifies theories with the pretopos completion of their syn-
tactic categories and every pretopos can be seen to arise in this manner
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(although, of course, inequivalent coherent categories may have equivalent
pretopos completions).
Furthermore there is a natural relation between these two categories:
for each coherent category C, there is a unique pretopos P (C) and functor
ηC : C → P (C) satisfying a suitable universal property. In short: every
coherent category has a unique pretopos completion — an operation cor-
responding roughly to taking a “maximal Morita extension” of the original
theory. In fact, P : Coh→ Pretop is a 2-functor (see Makkai, 1987). And
even more is true: Pretop is “almost” a reflective sub-2-category of Coh.
More precisely, Pretop is a full reflective sub-2-category of FinSit, the 2-
category of “finitary” sites (i.e. categories equipped with finitely-generated
Grothendieck topologies) – this is a special case of a far more general result
proven by Shulman (2012).
For the purposes of this paper, we needn’t make a decision about the
precise definition of Th. However, for concreteness, let us say that we are in
favor of the identification Th = Pretop. (As explained above, this means
that we are effectively choosing (ME) as our preferred notion of equivalence.)
Although nothing we say here hinges on this choice, let us say a couple
of things about why it is a natural choice to make (other than our faith
in (ME)). Firstly, there is a very precise sense in which – from a logical
point of view – the pretopos completion of a coherent category adds only
those concepts that are already definable from the coherent structure of the
original category. Secondly, the pretopos completion is the maximal such
extension, i.e. it contains everything that is definable from the coherent
structure of a coherent category (for a precisification of this statement see
(Harnik, 2011)). As such, if one agrees with us that the initial syntactic
presentation of a theory does not constitute its essential content then moving
from Coh to Pretop should seem a very reasonable move to make.
Now what are the arrows in Pretop? Since the objects of Pretop are
categories, the arrows should be functors. Perhaps surprisingly, the arrows
we care about in this particular case are obtained by considering a preto-
pos as a coherent category (recall that every pretopos is coherent). But
do coherent categories have additional structure that ought to be preserved
by our arrows? The answer, in short, is yes: a coherent category has lim-
its and colimits that encode various syntactic structures — in particular,
conjunction, disjunction, and existential quantification. Thus, we define an
arrow between pretoposes P and P ′ to be a coherent functor in the sense of
(Johnstone, 2002, p. 34), also called a logical functor in (Makkai and Reyes,
1977, p. 121). In other words, we consider Pretop as a full subcategory of
17
Coh.12
Choosing coherent functors as arrows has the nice consequence that ar-
rows from PT to PS correspond to translations of the theory T into S (so do,
incidentally, arrows from CT to CS). A way to see this is the following: each
PT contains the so-called generic model MT of T (Johnstone, 2002, Propo-
sition D1.4.12.(ii)). This is a model of T taken in the pretopos completion
PT (recall that PT is coherent and therefore has the capacity to model any
coherent theory T ). It is generic in the sense that it satisfies exactly those
sentences that are provable in T , i.e.
MT |= φ ⇐⇒ T ` φ.
Now, since coherent functors preserve the coherent structure and since mod-
els of coherent theories in coherent categories are built using (only) that
coherent structure, we have that any coherent functor F :PT → D into a
coherent category D will give us a model F (MT ) of T in D. In particular,
when D = PT ′ for some other theory T
′ then F (MT ) is a model of T in
PT ′ . But a (S-)model of T ′ is simply a coherent functor from PT ′ into S.
Therefore, any model G:PT ′ → S of T ′ will also give rise to a model of T ,
viz. GF :PT → S. In plain terms: any model of T ′ contains a model of T ;
this is just another way of saying that there is a translation of T into T ′.13
Finally, it is important to note that everything we’ve said in this paragraph
can be said pretty much verbatim for syntactic categories themselves (rather
than their pretopos completions). More on translations and definability at
the level of syntactic categories can be found in (Caramello, 2012).
It should immediately be pointed out that Pretop is most naturally
thought of as a 2-category, rather than just a category. A 2-category C
is (roughly speaking) a category such that for any two objects a, b of C,
12The fact that it is reasonable to do so essentially boils down to the above-mentioned
fact that the pretopos completion of a coherent category is “definable” (in a precise sense)
from the coherent structure of the category in question. In particular, even though co-
herent morphisms will not, in general, preserve arbitrary coproducts or coequalizers, they
will preserve binary coproducts and coequalizers arising from equivalence relations. This
means that “disjoint unions” and “quotients by equivalence relations” are concepts within
the grasp of coherent logic and taking the pretopos completion of a coherent category
amounts to a (maximal) “definitional extension” of the original coherent category by
these definable concepts. Indeed, removing the scare quotes from the previous sentences
and making this way of talking about pretopos completions fully precise was one of the
motivations behind (Barrett and Halvorson, 2015b) and (Tsementzis, 2015).
13Indeed, in (Pitts, 1989) translations of a theory T into another theory T ′ are defined
to be models of T in PT ′ . This is the same thing as saying that translations are functors
CT → PT ′ which in turn is the same thing as saying that translations are functors PT →
PT ′ .
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instead of C(a, b) being a set of arrows from a to b, it is a category ; and
the composition operation on arrows is functorial (see Borceux, 1994; Lack,
2010). The arrows in the category C(a, b) are called 2-cells. The paradigm
example of a 2-category is Cat, the category of (small) categories, with
functors as arrows, and natural transformations as 2-cells. That is, if C
and D are categories, then Cat(C,D) is the category whose objects are
functors F : C → D, and whose arrows are natural transformations between
such functors. Similarly, we define Pretop(P, P ′) to be the category whose
objects are coherent functors from P to P ′, and whose arrows (2-cells) are
natural transformations.14
Basking in the full 2-categorical glory of Pretop is no mere pretension,
nor is it a pointless exercise to prepare us for the altitude sickness that
comes with the steep ascent towards higher category theory. It is, rather, a
perspective that brings, among other things, new purely logical insights.15
Whether these logical insights translate into insights about analogous con-
cepts in the philosophy of science remains to be seen – we devote Section 4
to plausible lines of investigation in this direction. For now, we turn to an
application of our point of view to a more concrete question in the philoso-
phy of science: the debate between the semantic and the syntactic views of
theories.
3 On the duality of syntax and semantics
Recall that the logical positivists hoped to provide an explication for the
notion of a scientific theory.16 That is, they hoped to be able to say that a
scientific theory is a certain sort of (rigorously defined) mathematical object.
But what kind of object? According to the earliest proposals (by Carnap and
others), a theory is a set of sentences in a formal language. This proposal
and its later elaborations have come to be known as the syntactic view of
theories.
As is well known, the syntactic view of theories was subjected to severe
criticism in the later 20th century. The consensus in the 1970s was the the
syntactic view couldn’t be salvaged, and required a wholesale replacement.
The proposed replacement was the so-called semantic view of theories, which
claims that a scientific theory is a collection of models — perhaps the models
14A 2-category is a “strict” version of a bicategory in the sense of (Be´nabou, 1967).
15To convince oneself of this one need look no further than Pitts’ proof of conceptual
completeness for coherent logic (resp. intuitionistic logic) using the 2-categorical structure
of Pretop (resp. HPretop, the category of Heyting pretoposes) – see (Pitts, 1987, 1989).
16For further elaboration of this story, see (Halvorson, 2015).
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of some first-order logical theory, or perhaps a collection of models of some
more general sort.17
It has long been thought that the semantic view of theories has many
advantages over the syntactic views – see e.g. the works of Suppe, van
Fraassen, and Lloyd, et al.. Of course, that claim presupposes that there is
a genuine dilemma of choice between the two points of view. Only a couple
of isolated philosophers have suggested that this might be a false dilemma
(see e.g. Friedman, 1982). In this section, we survey mathematical results
that argue for a formal duality between the syntactic and semantic points
of view. We also propose that this duality could be exploited in order to
better understand the structure of scientific theories.
Recall the previous discussion of Stone duality for theories in proposi-
tional logic. While it’s not true that a propositional theory can be recon-
structed from its category of models alone (i.e. the set of ultrafilters on the
Lindenbaum algebra), it can be reconstructed from the category of models
plus relevant topological information.
In recent years, logicians have attempted to generalize Stone duality to
the case of full first-order logic. And while the results to date are only
partial, they all point in a similar direction.18
First, Makkai (1991) makes use of an insight from  Los’ theorem: if
{mi}i∈I are models of a theory T , then so is an ultraproduct
∏
i∈I mi/U ,
where U is an ultrafilter on I. What’s more, in the case where T is a propo-
sitional theory, the ultraproduct
∏
i∈I mi/U is simply the Stone topology
limit of the sequence {mi}i∈I along the ultrafilter U . In other words, in
the propositional case the Stone topology on Mod(T ) can be alternatively
described as “ultraproduct structure” on Mod(T ); and the relevant functors
F : Mod(T )→ Mod(T ′) are those that preserve this ultraproduct structure
(i.e. that are continuous in the Stone topology).
Now Makkai defines an ultracategory to be a category with a sort of ul-
traproduct structure (see Makkai, 1991). Of course, the motivating example
of an ultracategory is the category Mod(T ) of models of a first-order theory.
Then the question arises:
Can a theory T be reconstructed from the corresponding ultracat-
egory Mod(T )?
17To be clear, Van Fraassen (2014) has recently pointed out that for him, a theory is a
class of models together with representational content. However, for this discussion, we
are concerned only with the mathematically representable part of a theory.
18Such dualities as the ones we will outline below sometimes go under the name of
“Isbell Duality” and many examples have been studied at a very high level of generality
– see Porst and Tholen (1991) and Barr et al. (2008) for a sampling.
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Makkai shows that the answer is Yes. For any pretopos P , let Θ(P ) =
Coh(P,S) denote the category of coherent functors from P into the category
S of sets (i.e. models of the theory corresponding to P ). Makkai shows that
there is another functor Γ : UCat → Pretopop, such that (Γ ◦ Θ)(P ) is





Unfortunately, this adjunction is not an equivalence of categories, as in the
case of propositional theories (i.e. Stone duality for Boolean algebras). In
particular, not every ultracategory is of the form Mod(T ) ' Coh(PT ,S),
for some first-order theory T . In slogan form: there are more ultracategories
than there are coherent theories.
A more recent attempt to generalize Stone duality has been undertaken
by Awodey and Forssell (2013). Here the insight comes not from model
theory (as in the case of Makkai’s ultraproducts), but from topos theory.
Joyal and Tierney (1984) proved that for every Grothendieck topos E , there
is a localic groupoid G such that E ' B(G), where B(G) is the topos of
continuous actions of G. It was also shown by Butz and Moerdijk (1998) that
when E has enough points — as is the case when E ' ET is the classifying
topos of a coherent theory — then G may be taken to be a topological
groupoid.19
The models of a (coherent) theory T naturally form a category Mod(T ).
Now, if we eliminate all non-isomorphism arrows from Mod(T ) then the
resulting category Modi(T ) is a groupoid, i.e. a category in which every
arrow has a two-sided inverse. Intuitively speaking, Modi(T ) is the category
of models of T and their symmetries (i.e. automorphisms).
19Roughly, locales are topological spaces without a notion of a point, axiomatized in-
stead with a primitive notion of a neighborhood and lattice operations on such neighbor-
hoods (corresponding to unions and intersections). The advantage of locales is that they
are amenable to a first-order axiomatization (albeit with a caveat: the category of locales
is defined as the dual of the category of models of that axiomatization). The disadvantage
is that they are strictly more general than topological spaces: every topological space
is a locale but not every locale is a topological space. More precisely, it can be shown
that the category of topological spaces is a coreflective subcategory of the category of
locales. For this and more motivation on “pointless” topology see the introductory survey
by Johnstone (1983).
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Since Mod(T ) doesn’t contain enough information to reconstruct T , a
fortiori Modi(T ) doesn’t contain enough information to reconstruct T . To
reiterate, a theory’s models and their automorphisms do not tell us every-
thing about that theory! But now the insight of Awodey and Forssell was
that if Modi(T ) is equipped with an appropriate topology, then the resulting
topological groupoid G, could be the very G that appears in the represen-
tation theorem of Butz and Moerdijk. To be more precise, if CT is the
syntactic category of T , and if Sh(CT ) is the topos of sheaves on CT , then
Sh(CT ) ' B(GT ),
where GT is the topological groupoid of models of T , and B(GT ) is the
Grothendieck topos of continuous actions of GT . Furthermore, since the pre-
topos completion of CT can be recovered as the coherent objects in Sh(CT ),
it follows that the pretopos completion of CT can be recovered from the
topological groupoid GT . In other words, T itself can be recovered from GT
up to Morita equivalence.
This result suggests that the syntactic and semantic categories of theories
are dual to each other. On the one hand, we have Pretop, the category of
theories (understood as (conceptually complete) syntactic categories). On
the other hand, we have TopGrpd, the category of semantic categories, viz.
topological groupoids. The “semantic functor” Θ : Pretop→ TopGrpd is
defined by first taking Pretop(P,S), the category of set-valued models of P ,
then restricting to the isomorphisms between models, and finally equipping
the resulting groupoid with the “logical” topology. The “syntactic functor”
Γ : TopGrpd → Pretop is defined by taking a topological groupoid G to
the topos B(G) of continuous G-sets, and then extracting the pretopos of
coherent objects in B(G).20




However, once again, this adjunction is not an equivalence of categories; i.e.
TopGrpd is not exactly dual to Pretop. Thus, a natural question: can the
20Technically, Awodey and Forssell work with the category dCoh rather than Pretop,
and the results must be adjusted accordingly.
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semantic category Pretopop be characterized independently of the functor
Θ? i.e. can we provide an independent characterization of the category
of (semantically presented) theories? Doing so would lead to a so-called
“perfect duality” but such an independent characterization has so far proved
elusive.21
Why do mathematicians value duality results? One reason is that it
enables them to transfer results and concepts from one category to its dual
category. Thus, if we had a duality result for syntactic and semantic cate-
gories, then we could use information about theories as presented semanti-
cally in order to understanding theories as presented syntactically, and vice
versa.
For example, suppose that the theory T ′ results from adding a new
predicate symbol (but no new axioms) to the theory T . There is then an
obvious translation of T into T ′, namely the translation that takes each piece
of non-logical vocabulary to itself. This translation corresponds to a functor
F : PT → PT ′ that is faithful, full (since no new functional relations are
created), but not essentially surjective (since no formula from the smaller
language maps to the new predicate symbol). Recalling that F is an arrow
in Pretop, there is a dual arrow F ∗ : GT ′ → GT in the semantic category
TopGrp. It is natural to ask then: given that F has such and such features,
what features does its dual arrow F ∗ have? In this case, the failure of
essential surjectivity of F corresponds to the fact that F ∗ is not full, i.e. it
forgets structure in the sense of (Weatherall, 2016).22
Of course, the question can also be asked the other way around: given
a functor K : M → N between categories of models, how do features of K
correspond to features of its dual arrow K∗ in the syntactic category? But
here we pause, because in our opinion, the semantic category — whose ob-
jects are categories of models — has not yet been adequately characterized.
21One reason for this – mysterious as it may sound – is certainly the fact that there seems
to be nothing inherently “category-theoretic” about ultraproducts. As Makkai’s work
proves and Los’ theorem has long made obvious, taking ultraproducts is a fundamental
operation when it comes to elementary classes: elementary classes are exactly those classes
closed under elementary equivalence and the taking of ultraproducts. Since every pretopos
corresponds to an elementary class (more precisely: to the category of models of a coherent
theory) one would imagine that any such characterization of Pretop would amount to a
characterization of “closure under ultraproducts”. Absent any useful purely categorical
description of ultraproducts (or even ultrafilters) this seems like a significant obstruction.
Nevertheless the work of Leinster (2013) on ultrafilter monads as codensity monads might
provide a way out, though this is still very far from being made precise.
22It ought to be remarked that the “functorial” explication of the idea of forgetting
structure (or properties or stuff) is originally due to John Baez.
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First, not every topological groupoid is the groupoid of models of a coherent
theory, i.e. Pretopop has fewer objects than TopGrpd. Second, Pretopop
is a 2-category; hence, if Pretopop is to be seen as living inside TopGrpd,
then we must understand the latter as itself a 2-category. But what is the
appropriate 2-categorical structure and how should we understand it?23
So, for anyone who wishes to develop the semantic view of theories, the
following is a pressing question:
Given two categories of models M and N, what is a fruitful def-
inition of an arrow K : M → N? Furthermore, which arrows
should be thought of as “reductions” of one theory to another,
which as “equivalences” of theories, and which as other theoret-
ical relations with which philosophers of science have been con-
cerned?
Recalling what we said earlier: to choose the arrows of a category is to choose
a notion of equivalence, and hence to choose a notion of identity of the cat-
egory’s objects. (Here the objects of the semantic category are themselves
categories, viz. categories of models.) Thus, until one proposes a notion of
arrows between semantic categories, then one lacks a clear notion of equiv-
alence of theories, and hence of how a theory can be identified semantically.
For philosophers of science, this issue demands immediate attention.
But why do we care about these results and how do they relate to
the framework we have been advocating? Essentially, because the above-
described duality between the category of syntactic and (suitably structured)
semantic categories offers a large-scale dissolution of the syntax-semantics
dichotomy. What this guarantees – and the reason why it is important – is
that intertheoretic relations get preserved regardless of whether we replace a
theory with its syntactic category or its category of models. In other words,
the way in which a syntactic category of a theory T “sits” within other syn-
tactic categories is equivalent (in an appropriate sense) to the way in which
Mod(T ) “sits” within other categories of models. That this is the case is
in no way trivial, or automatic. One could very well imagine it being true
that moving back and forth between syntactic categories and categories of
models changed the way in which these different presentations of a theory
related to other theories. But it does not – this is what makes the duality
results presented in this section essential, and what paves the way for several
of the technical projects we will now go on to outline.
23Moerdijk (1988, 1990) defines a bicategory LocGrpd of localic groupoids, with bi-
modules as arrows, and shows that G 7→ B(G) is an equivalence of categories between
LocGrpd and the bicategory of Grothendieck toposes.
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4 Future Directions
Given this elegant formal framework, numerous technical questions — of
philosophical interest — suggest themselves. We will now list and discuss a
few such questions.
1. We saw that if the syntactic categories CT and CS are equivalent, then
the theories T and S are Morita equivalent, i.e. that (SE) implies
(ME). We also saw that the converse fails: two theories can be Morita
equivalent even even though their syntactic categories are inequivalent.
An interesting question we can now raise is this: What kind of con-
ditions can we place on theories such that (SE) coincides with (ME)?
(One well-known case in which they do coincide is that of algebraic
theories.) Furthermore, what can we say about Morita equivalences
over particular categories? For example, for any two first-order theo-
ries T and T ′ whose semantic categories are equivalent (over S, and
not necessarily naturally) how can we characterize their relation from
a purely syntactic standpoint? And what about their thin categories?
Namely, if
S−Mode(T ) ' S−Mode(T ′)
then – purely syntactically – how are T and T ′ related?
2. Let’s consider some natural relations between theories. First, let T
be a theory in signature Σ, and let T ′ be an extension of T by some
additional axioms, also in the language Σ (such “extensions” are also
called “quotients”). Then there will be a canonical functor F : CT →
CT ′ . What can we say about this functor? What features does it
have? In the case of geometric theories a lot of work in this area has
been done by O. Caramello starting with the “Duality Theorem” in
her Phd thesis – for a big picture view see (Caramello, 2009, 2010).
See also (Forssell, 2013).
Similarly, let T be a theory in signature Σ, and let T ′ be the same
theory, but considered in a larger signature Σ′. Again there will be
a canonical functor F : CT → CT ′ . What features does this functor
have?
Furthermore, philosophers of science have been interested in questions
about when one theory T ′ is reducible to another theory T . Can re-
duction be thought of as a functor F : CT ′ → CT (see Van Benthem
and Pearce, 1984)? How does this functorial account compare to the
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classical Nagelian account (see Nagel, 1979, Ch 11)? How does this
functorial account compare to semantic accounts (see Bickle, 1998)?
3. If we were to think of Coh or Pretop as merely a category, then a nat-
ural technical question might be: does this category have limits? Or,
does this category have colimits? And, if it does have limits or colim-
its, then do these have any sort of natural interpretation as operations
on theories? For example, is there any sense in which a coproduct of
two coherent categories represents a sort of amalgamation of the two
theories? And if so, does the notion of an “amalgamation of theories”
have a clear interpretation?
However, it’s more natural to think of either Coh or Pretop as a
2-category, in which case the better questions have to do with the ex-
istence of limits and colimits in the bicategorical sense. Does Pretop
have 2-limits and 2-colimits? And if it does, do these limits and col-
imits have a natural interpretation as operations on theories?24
Philosophers of science should be particularly interested in whether
the categorical structure of Pretop can be used to explicate various
relations between theories, such as limiting relations.
4. The relation between “thick” and “thin” semantic categories provides
very fertile ground for investigation, as noted above. One obstruc-
tion here is that the thin semantic categories of first-order theories
are almost invariably “too thin” in the sense that they rarely contain
interesting categorical structure (e.g. limits, colimits etc.)
On the other hand, it is perhaps worth investigating relations between
pairs of theories (T1, T2) such that there are interesting functors
F : Mode(T1)→ Mod(T2)
where T1 would be thought of as the “background spacetime” theory
and T2 would be thought of as the “physical system theory”. To be
a little more specific, this formal situation seems to us an interest-
ing generalization of the nowadays very common situation (e.g. with
(Q)FTs) where we have a category of “state spaces” represented by
algebraic objects (e.g. Hilbert spaces, C∗-algebras) and a category of
“spacetimes” understood as categories of “physical spacetimes with
24Makkai (1995) proves a version of the Craig interpolation theorem using the 2-
categorical version of a pushout of syntactic categories.
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embeddings as arrows” and where a theory of physics is defined as a
functor relating those two.
For example, Fewster (2015) defines a locally covariant theory to be a
functor
F :Bkgnd→ Phys .
In Fewster’s set-up, Bkgnd seems to us to be best understood as
essentially the thin category of models of some theory, since the mor-
phisms are basically elementary embeddings (see Fewster, 2015, p. 4).
On the other hand, the categories which he calls Phys seem to us to
be best understood as the thick categories of models of some theory,
since they are usually categories of algebraic structures. This suggests
that it is worth looking at what kind of interesting things can be said
about such functors, when T1 and T2 are first-order theories: what can
we say about them, modulo some constraints on T1, T2 and F? Is this
a fruitful general set-up with which to study properties of (Q)FTs?
It might not be immediately clear how this is related to the category
of theories perspective that we have been advocating. It very much
does. Assuming for the time being that both Mode(T1) and Mod(T2)
live in the same category Th, then what we are suggesting is to study
certain objects in the category of arrows of Th, i.e. the category
whose objects are the arrows of Th and morphisms are commutative
squares connecting these arrows. (Once again, sinceTh is a 2-category,
its arrow category will also have a natural 2-categorical structure.)
It appears to us to be a fruitful way to understand field theories in
general: as functors relating a “spacetime” category (e.g. Minkowski
spacetimes) to a “state-space” category (e.g. C∗-algebras).25
5. The (2-)category Pretop might be used to explicate the notion of a
symmetry of a theory.
In recent literature in philosophy of science, discussion of symmetries
has proceeded in absence of an agreed upon background framework.
These discussions sometimes think of symmetries in terms of equations,
and sometimes in terms of models. What’s more, we find ambiguity
25A complication arises here, however, with respect to how to actually view Mode(T1)
and Mod(T2) as living in the same category. It is not immediately clear how this can be
done in an interesting way when we’ve identified Th as either Coh or Pretop. This is an
important question in itself to which we have no satisfying answer at present. As a result,
we have decided to present the above question in terms of functors between “free-floating”
categories of models. We thank an anonymous referee for pressing us on this point.
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about whether symmetries operate at the level of individual models of
a theory, or at the level of the collection of all models of a theory.
A category-theoretic point of view makes it clear, however, that there
are both syntactic and semantic notions of symmetries — as can be
made precise with the category Th of theories (understood here as
Pretop). Let T be a theory and let PT be its syntactic category,
which is an object of Th.26 Then we propose:
A syntactic symmetry of T is an auto-equivalence of the syn-
tactic category PT .
Recall that a coherent functor F : PT → PS corresponds to a trans-
lation from T into S. Thus, an auto-equivalence F : PT → PT corre-
sponds to a translation of T into itself (i.e. a sort of permutation of
the vocabulary of T ).
But more is true. A coherent functor F : PT → PS induces a functor
F ∗ : Mod(S)→ Mod(T ) from models of S to models of T (see Gajda et
al., 1987; Makkai and Reyes, 1977). In particular, an automorphism
F : PT → PT induces a functor F ∗ : Mod(T ) → Mod(T ) on the
category of models of T , which raises another technical question:
Is it true that any essentially invertible functor G : Mod(T )→
Mod(T ) has the feature that G = F ∗ for some coherent func-
tor F : PT → PT ?
The answer to this question is No, as can be seen by again looking
at the example of the two propositional theories. Thus, philosophers
of science should not necessarily suppose that any auto-equivalence
G : Mod(T )→ Mod(T ) should count as a symmetry of T . But can we
say something about further conditions on G so that it is indeed dual
to some functor F on the syntactic category PT ?
6. Since the demise of the syntactic view of theories, philosophers of sci-
ence have been fond of pointing out that interesting scientific theories
— even those in rigorous mathematical physics — typically fail to
admit a first-order axiomatization. Thus, we might conclude that a
typical scientific theory cannot be described by an object in Coh or
26A note of clarification on terminology: we are now using the term “syntactic category”
to refer to an arbitrary object of the category of theories Th rather than the explicit
construction as carried out in Section 1.1.
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Pretop. We already dealt with this point at the end of Section 1 but
let us now add a few more words.
Firstly, is this dismissal too fast? Note that some logics stronger than
first-order logic — e.g. geometric logic, or even higher-order logics —
will also give rise to syntactic categories that are coherent. In fact,
if a logic is stronger than first-order logic, then the corresponding
categories can be expected to have more structure than coherent cat-
egories.27
Relatedly, recent work in “cohesive” homotopy type theory (CoHoTT)
uses syntactic methods (based on a logic much more “exotic” than first-
order logic) to study higher gauge theories (see (Schreiber, 2013) as
well as (Corfield, 2016) in this volume). Among other things, Schreiber
envisions a certain class of ∞-toposes (the so-called “cohesive” ones)
as the correct setting at which to study the foundations of higher gauge
theories, exactly because these cohesive ∞-toposes are (conjectured to
be) the syntactic categories of CoHoTT. Of course, Schreiber’s use of
syntactic methods is not motivated by considerations on theoretical
equivalence and the structure of scientific theories – his mathematical
work is carried out with the explicit goal of articulating a general
foundation for higher gauge theories. Nevertheless, the way in which
he blends syntactic and semantic methods is a great illustration, in
our opinion, of how representing scientific theories as categories (in
his case higher categories) is an illuminating perspective to take.
So, is being a coherent category a minimal necessary condition for
representing a bona fide scientific theory? In any case, it would be
natural to ask:
Given a formalized theory T of the empirical sciences, is
there some category CT that can be thought of as the “syn-
tactic category” of T?
Consider a couple of examples. First, let T be Einstein’s general theory
of relativity. We do have some sense of what the semantic category
— i.e. the category of models of T — ought to be, viz. the category
of differentiable manifolds with Lorentzian metric and stress-energy
tensor satisfying Einstein’s field equations. But is there a category CT
27For example, in the case of intuitionistic type theory (ITT), there is a syntactic cat-
egory CITT (produced by a similar but different process than the one we outlined for
first-order theories T ) which bears the structure of an elementary topos – see Lambek and
Scott (1986) for the classical account.
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that could be considered the syntactic category of GTR?28 And could
the failure to distinguish between semantic and syntactic points of view
be partially responsible for some of the difficulties that philosophers
have had understanding the nature of symmetries in GTR?
As a second example, let T be quantum mechanics. In this case we
also have a sense of what the semantic category of T ought to be —
namely, the category of (finite-dimensional) Hilbert spaces and linear
operators. (This example was one of the main motivators for the
semantic view, at least in the mind of van Fraassen.) Now, what
might the syntactic category CT of T look like? Is there a way to
present quantum mechanics syntactically? If so, what are its axioms,
and what sorts of objects does it quantify over?
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have assumed that it can be useful, for a philosophical
understanding of science, to represent theories as mathematical objects. But
what is a good, fruitful mathematical framework for understanding theories?
We have surveyed a number of concepts and results from category theory,
which we believe provide strong evidence that it should be the locus of
attention for formal philosophers of science.
Firstly, we have shown that category theory provides the resources to
get past philosophy of science’s false dichotomy, viz. the dichotomy be-
tween syntactic versus semantic presentations of theories. On the one hand,
a semantic presentation of a theory is nonetheless a presentation – written
in a mathematical language. On the other hand, the syntactic category of
a theory is a hybrid object, neither purely syntactic, nor purely semantic.
Enough of the original syntax of theory can be reconstructed from its asso-
ciated syntactic category. Moreover, having equivalent syntactic categories
guarantees having equivalent categories of models. As such, the syntac-
tic category of a theory unites the semantic and the syntactic approach to
(first-order) theories, via the notion of Morita equivalence: as long as we
care about theories up to (a suitable notion of) definitional equivalence and
as long as we care about the classes of models of a theory up to its categori-
cal structure, then the tension between syntactic and semantic presentations
disappears. With this formal groundwork in place our most urgent task now
is to carry as much of this lesson as possible over to the philosophy of science.
28One might hope for some help here from investigations in synthetic differential geom-
etry. See, for example, (Reyes, 2009).
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Secondly, with this false dichotomy set aside, philosophers of science are
now set free from the illusion of a direct access to the “theory in itself”
(sometimes erroneously identified with a class of models), and to study how
different representations of the world can be related one to another. The
category Th is the first formal approximation to how this kind of project
might be carried out. The kind of notions about theoretical relations that
will emerge will no doubt be interesting and we hope the philosophy of
science lends a keen ear. Aside from this however, the very notion of studying
scientific theories in their totality (i.e. as a structured whole) should lead to
a philosophy of science more directly attuned to the way theoretical physics
is carried out today – where the interaction and interplay of (sometimes
incompatible) theories is not seen merely as a temporary state of confusion
as we approach some ultimate truth, but rather the necessary interactions
that have to take place within any ecosystem before more advanced life can
evolve out of it.
Acknowledgments: Thanks to Thomas Barrett for conversation and feed-
back and to two anonymous referees for numerous illuminating suggestions.
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